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NOTES
AN EMPLOYER'S IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
RESTITUTION UNDER SECTION 403 OF ERISA
INTRODUCTION
Employee benefit plans' have grown dramatically.2 Each year, em-
ployers contribute vast sums of money3 and other assets' to these plans.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)5 governs the
economically and socially powerful system6 of private employee benefit
1. An "employee benefit plan" includes both welfare and pension plans. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An "employee welfare plan" is a program providing medical,
surgical or hospital benefits or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death
or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services. See id. § 1002(1). An "em-
ployee pension plan" is a fund which provides retirement income or results in a deferral
of income. See id. § 1002(2)(A).
2. A startling expansion of coverage has occurred: In 1940, an estimated 4 million
employees were covered by private pension plans; by 1950, the figure had increased to
almost 10 million; in 1960, over 21 million; and in 1979, approximately 30 million em-
ployees were covered. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in
2 Legislative History of The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 2348,
2350, (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]; United States Dep't of Labor, Pat-
terns of Worker Coverage by Private Pension Plans iii (1980).
An astounding accumulation of assets has occurred to finance these benefit programs.
In 1940, private pension assets totaled $2.4 billion. See Williams, Development ofthe New
Pension Reform Laws, 26 Lab. L.J. 135, 135 (1975). In 1973, more than $150 billion was
held in reserve to pay benefits. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra, at 2348, 2350. Today, estimates of a thousand
billion dollars have been given. See Transcript of NBC White Paper: The Biggest Lump
of Money in the World 2 (1985) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). "We're
talking about the largest lump of money ever put together under one governing law in the
history of the world." Id. (statement of Robert A.C. Monks, former U.S. pension
administrator).
3. In 1978, employers contributed $48.5 billion to these plans. See United States
Dep't of Labor, Estimates of Participant and Financial Characteristics of Private Pension
Plans 19 (1983).
4. Employers have contributed real estate instead of cash to plans. See Suhrbier,
Contributing Real Estate in Lieu of Cash to a Pension Plan, 10 Journal of Pension Plan-
ning and Compliance 217, 217 (1984). If the employee pension plan is an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP), the employer contribution may be company stock. See B. Cole-
man, Primer on Employee Retirement Income Security Act 15 (1985).
5. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 of the U.S.C.). ERISA is a voluminous document. The Act con-
sists of four parts: Title I of ERISA is concerned with protecting employee benefits, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982); Title II provides amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
relating to pension plans and is scattered in titles 5, 26, 31 and 42 of the U.S. Code, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 898-994 (1974); Title III covers the responsibilities of the
Department of Treasury and the Department of Labor, the two federal agencies which
administer and enforce the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1982); Title IV establishes the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to administer an insurance program for single and
multiemployer plans, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra
note 4, at 3-8 (discussion of the four titles).
6. The NBC documentary entitled "The Biggest Lump of Money in the World"
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plans.7 In response to the broken promise of private plans," Congress
passed ERISA,9 which seeks primarily to protect the individual's benefit
rights.'° When enacting ERISA, however, Congress also recognized that
the Act's requirements should not overburden employers and thus dis-
courage creation of employee benefit plans."
revealed the tremendous impact pension funds have not only on the lives of those depend-
ing on these plans for their subsistence after retirement, but also on the whole U.S. econ-
omy. Pension funds have become the permanent owners of corporate America. Robert
Monks, former U.S. pension administrator, said that he did not think that "anybody can
make a commercial decision in America today without considering the implications of
pension money. When Mr. Pickens makes an offer for Company A, ERISA plans own a
lot of. . . Company A." Transcript of NBC White Paper: The Biggest Lump of Money
in the World, supra note 2, at 6; see 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1600 (state-
ment of Sen. Williams).
7. ERISA does not govern public pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1982)
(provisions of Title I do not apply to any governmental plan); see also id. § 1002(32)
(defining "governmental plan").
8. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 2348, 2352; 120 Cong. Rec. 4279 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legisla-
tive History, supra note 2, at 3372 (statement of Rep. Brademas); 119 Cong. Rec. 30,003
(1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1599 (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams); Rosenstein, Private Enforcement of Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 47
U. Cin. L. Rev. 272, 272-76 (1978); Williams, supra note 2, at 136-37.
9. ERISA was signed into law on Labor Day, September 2, 1974, by President Ger-
ald Ford. See ERISA: Text of the Law as Amended through 1982 vii (K. Gill ed. 1983).
In 1980, Congress amended ERISA by enacting the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendment Act [MPPAA]. The basic purposes of the MPPAA are to protect partici-
pants and beneficiaries in multiemployer plans and to eliminate problems that impeded
the maintenance and growth of such plans. See 126 Cong. Rec. 20,178 (1980) (statement
of Sen. Javits). The MPPAA primarily address the problems created when employers
withdraw from multiemployer plans. See 126 Cong. Rec. 20,177 (1980) (statement of
Sen. Javits); Note, The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980." The Defeat
of Employer Reliance Interests in Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 32 Buf-
falo L. Rev. 283, 283-87 (1983). See also B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 8-11 (discussion of
ERISA updates).
10. See Morse v. Stanley, 566 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), afJ'd in part and
rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), (c) (1982); H.R. Rep.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at
2348, 2348.
11. The voluntary nature of private pension plans required that Congress not over-
burden employers. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 2
Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2348, 2348 ("committee has been constrained to
recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans"); S. Rep. No. 383, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1069, 1069 ("com-
mittee recognized that private retirement plans are voluntary on the part of the employer,
and, therefore, it has carefully weighed the additional costs to the employer and mini-
mized them to the extent consistent with minimum standards for retirement benefits");
Grubbs, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act: The First Decade, 11 Journal of
Pension Planning and Compliance 7, 8 (1985) (pension funds are voluntary). In fact,
Congress designed ERISA to promote expansion of private retirement plans. See 126
Cong. Rec. 20,177 (1980) (statement of Sen. Javits) (one of the purposes of MPPAA is to
eliminate problems that impeded maintenance and growth of multiemployer plans); 120
Cong. Rec. 29,209 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 4702 (state-
ment of Rep. Tiernan) ("Both the Senate and House have put in long hours working to
reform the pension system, to strengthen the position of the retiree without discouraging
the growth of private pension plans."); 120 Cong. Rec. 3978 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legis-
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ERISA provides comprehensive rules for pension and welfare plans.' 2
To protect participants" 3 and beneficiaries" 4 rights,1 5 the Act creates
minimum vesting,' 6 participation"7 and funding standards,"8 and imposes
reporting, disclosure' 9 and fiduciary requirements 20 on plan administra-
tors2' and trustees. 22 One fiduciary section requires that the assets of a
plan be held in trust for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the
participants and beneficiaries.23 This section states that the assets of a
plan can never inure to an employer.24 Employers, however, often mis-
lative History, supra note 2, at 3294 (statement of Rep. Perkins) (statement which incor-
porated subcommittee report stating that ERISA was designed in part to promote
expansion of private retirement plans). When amending ERISA by enacting the
MPPAA, Congress continued to realize the need to maintain a balance between the need
of employers and the plan. See 126 Cong. Rec. 23,038 (1980) (statement of Rep. Thomp-
son); 126 Cong. Rec. 20,185 (1980) (statement of Sen. Long); 126 Cong. Rec. 20,177
(1980) (statement of Sen. Williams).
12. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhat-
tan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446
U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
ERISA applies to employee benefit plans established or maintained by both employers
and employee organizations. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982); see also id. § 1002(4), (5)
(defining "employee organization" and "employer"). These plans must meet the applica-
ble requirements of ERISA or lose their qualified status under § 401 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. See Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 275. Even if an employer does not elect to
have an employee pension plan qualified, it still must satisfy the requirements of ERISA
if the Act applies to the plan. See id.
13. The term "participant" means any past or present employee or past or present
member of an employee organization who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit
from an employee benefit plan or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive such a
benefit. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
14. The term "beneficiary" means any person or entity designated by a participant, or
by the terms of the employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit
from such plan. See id. § 1002(8), (9).
15. See B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 3; Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 274-76.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 4-5 (re-
viewing vesting rights).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 4 (re-
viewing participation requirements).
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1085 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra note 4, at
35-37 (reviewing funding requirements). Employers may be severely penalized for failing
to satisfy these funding standards. See id. at 5.
19. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 4
(reviewing reporting and disclosure requirements).
20. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982). See generally B. Coleman, supra note 4, at 5-
6 (reviewing fiduciary requirements).
21. The "administrator" is specifically designated by the plan or plan sponsor. If
there is neither a designated administrator nor a plan sponsor, the administrator is the
person prescribed by the Secretary's regulation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16) (1982).
22. Plan administrators and trustees are fiduciaries as defined by 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (1982). See also Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34, 41-42 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(trustees' fiduciary duty), affid, 699 F.2d 1091 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Nass v. Staff Retirement
Plan of Local 810, 515 F. Supp. 950, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y.) (administrators are fiduciaries),
afl'd mer., 671 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1981); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1985) (fiduciary includes
any administrator, officer, trustee or custodian).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1982).
24. See id.
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takenly overcontribute to these plans.25 Thus, this section also contains
an exception to its exclusive purpose rule by stating that an employer's
mistaken contributions may be returned.26
Although this section allows for the return of mistaken contributions,
its operation is unclear. Courts disagree on whether ERISA confers on
employers an implied right of restitution for mistaken contributions
when the plan trustees do not voluntarily return them."
This Note argues that an implied cause of action for restitution exists
for employers under section 403 of ERISA. In discerning the intent of
Congress, this Note focuses on the impact of ERISA's unique preemp-
tion provision on state restitution law and the federal courts' power to
create common law in the private pension plan area.
IMPLIED RIGHT OF RESTITUTION UNDER SECTION 403
In 1973, thirty-six million workers were covered by private pension
plans.28 However, many of these covered employees never received
promised benefits.29 Congressional subcommittees investigated the ori-
gin of this problem and found that lack of vesting provisions, inadequate
funding standards and premature plan terminations caused the nonpay-
ment of promised benefits. 30 Congress passed ERISA to restore credibil-
ity to the private pension system.3'
A. Civil Enforcement
ERISA creates rights32 that ensure the actual receipt of promised ben-
25. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1982).
27. Compare Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d
1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985) (§ 403(c)(2)(A) of ERISA confers on employers an implied
right for restitution of mistakenly paid contributions), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1986) with Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F.
Supp. 307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (§ 403(c)(2)(A) does not confer on employers an im-
plied right for restitution of mistakenly paid contributions), affid mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d
Cir. 1983). See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
28. See 119 Cong. Rec. 30,003 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2,
at 1600 (statement of Sen. Williams).
29. See 119 id., reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1599-1600 (discuss-
ing the incident where 4500 Studebaker workers lost 85% of benefits because of insuffi-
cient plan assets and also the Departments of Labor and Treasury study reports that
19,000 workers lost vested benefits); Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 272 (estimated that only
ten percent received benefits); Williams, supra note 2, at 136 (fewer than one-quarter
received benefits).
30. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1980);
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1974), re-
printed in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2590, 2600-03.
31. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1980);
H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 2348, 2355-56; 119 Cong. Rec. 30,005 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 1605 (statement of Sen. Williams).
32. ERISA's reporting and disclosure, participation, vesting, funding and fiduciary
requirements and the rights given to participants and beneficiaries are coterminous. For
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efits to plan participants and beneficiaries.3 3 The administration of the
Act is entrusted to the Department of Labor and the Department of the
Treasury.34 In addition, section 502 of ERISA a5 specifically empowers
pension participants, beneficiaries and fiduciaries to enforce the provi-
sions of ERISA.36 This section is powerful because it explicitly grants
pension participants and beneficiaries a right to sue plan administrators,
employers, trustees and the plan itself 37 to recover benefits and enforce
rights.3
8
Employers, however, are not explicitly empowered39 to assert these ex-
example, ERISA requires that the plan administrator furnish certain information to the
participants, see supra note 19, which simultaneously gives participants the right to re-
ceive such information. See Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 274-75.
33. The legislative history of ERISA reveals that the Act's requirements were aimed
at securing employee's pension rights. See H.R. Rep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2590, 2597; H.R. Rep. No. 533,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2348,
2352.
34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1135-1137, 1202 (1982).
35. Id § 1132.
36. See id § 1132(a). Section 1132(a) states:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in
the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secre-
tary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter, or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of this
section.
Id.
37. See id. § 1132(d) (an employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under Title I of
ERISA).
38. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3093 (1985);
H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 326-27 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative His-
tory, supra note 2, at 4277, 4593-94; H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 17 (1973),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2348, 2349, 2364; S. Rep. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 587, 621;
119 Cong. Rec. 30,005 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1604
(statement of Sen. Williams). See generally Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 278-83 (discus-
sion of the various individual enforcement methods).
39. An employer can be a fiduciary under ERISA and therefore fall within one of
section 502's enumerated parties. See Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d
1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985) (ERISA permits employers to wear "two hats" and thus
1985]
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press causes of action4° provided by section 502." Although given no
assume fiduciary status only when and to the extent that they function as plan adminis-
trators); United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 669 F.2d
124, 128 (3d Cir. 1982) (employer as fiduciary can sue under § 502). In these cases,
employers were not seeking to recover mistaken contributions.
40. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983). Participants and beneficiaries have a cause of action pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) to
recover accrued benefits, to seek declaratory relief concerning their future benefits, to
enjoin a plan administrator from improperly refusing to pay benefits in the future, and to
remove a fiduciary if he violates his duties. ERISA also authorizes the award of attor-
ney's fees. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3093 (1985).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982); Tuvia Convalescent Center, Inc. v. National
Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 717 F.2d 726, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1983); Fentron
Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
Several circuits and lower courts have addressed the issue of whether an employer has
standing to sue under § 502 of ERISA. Compare Tuvia, 717 F.2d at 730 (an employer
has no standing to bring an action under § 502) with Fentron, 674 F.2d at 1304-05 (em-
ployer has standing under § 502); see also Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d
1101, 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer qua employer has no standing under § 502 to seek
declaratory judgment that ERISA superseded a state law); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Bell, 596 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D. Kan. 1984) (employer has no standing under § 502 to
seek declaratory judgment action on whether a state statute is preempted by ERISA);
R.M. Bowler Contract Hauling Co., v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund,
547 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D. Ill. 1982) (employer lacks standing under § 502 to seek
declaratory judgment of rights and liabilities); Modem Woodcrafts, Inc. v. Hawley, 534
F. Supp. 1000, 1013-14 (D. Conn. 1982) (employer lacks standing under § 502 to sue
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty based on allegation that trustees forced employer to
contribute too much); Central Tool Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Nat'l Pen-
sion Fund, 523 F. Supp. 812, 814 n.4 (D.D.C. 1981) (employer's challenge to cancellation
of its employees' benefit rights dismissed for lack of standing). This Note suggests that
these decisons can be reconciled by placing them into two categories-Category 1: denial
of employer standing under § 502 as a denial of an implied cause of action under this
section; Category 2: either permitting or not permitting employer third party standing.
The cases falling into Category I are those in which the employer sues on his own
behalf for a remedy which will not directly benefit plan participants. See Great Lakes,
716 F.2d at 1102-03 (employer seeking clarification of whether a state law is preempted
by ERISA); Blue Cross, 596 F. Supp. at 1055-56 (same); Tuvia Convalescent Center, Inc.
v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employee, 553 F. Supp. 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (employer seeking money damages from plan for breach of fiduciary duty for fail-
ure to provide requested information), aff'd, 717 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1983); R. M. Bowler,
547 F. Supp. at 783 (employer seeking clarification of his rights and liabilities under the
plan); Modern Woodcrafts, 534 F. Supp. at 1006-07 (employer sought remedy for finan-
cial injury caused by breach of fiduciary duty).
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke a court's
jurisdiction has alleged a sufficient personal stake in the controversy as to assure the
"concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues . . . ." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). This personal stake requires an injury in fact caused by the
challenged conduct. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 3531 (1984).
The courts deciding the Category 1 cases denied standing to employers under § 502
because employers were not listed as one of the specified parties in § 502. See Tuvia, 717
F.2d at 730; Great Lakes, 716 F.2d at 1102-03; Blue Cross, 596 F. Supp. at 1058; R.M.
Bowler, 547 F. Supp. at 783-84; Modern Woodcrafts, 534 F. Supp. at 1012-14. The courts
in Category 1 never focused on the employer's personal stake in the outcome or the
causal connection between the claimed injury and challenged conduct. By denying em-
ployers standing because of their exclusion from the list in § 502, these courts simultane-
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express cause of action, does an employer have an implied cause of action
ously prevent any implied causes of action under this section for employers because they
will never have standing to assert such an action. Courts should not use standing as a
shield from the task of determining whether a party has an implied cause of action. See
Associaton of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158 (1970)
(whether statutes gave petitioners a "legal interest" were separate questions on the merits
from whether they had standing to sue).
These courts that denied employers standing under § 502 did not determine whether
the employers had alleged a personal interest in the outcome of the litigation, but instead
examined the section's language and Congress' intent. See, e.g., Tuyia, 717 F.2d at 729-
30; Great Lakes, 716 F.2d at 1103-04. This approach confuses the law of standing with
whether an implied cause of action exists. A better approach would be to allow an em-
ployer who has been injured to present his claim to the court and then for the court to
determine separately whether a private cause of action exists for the employer under
§ 502. Cf California Cartage Co. v. United States, 721 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 110 (1984) (court discussed separately the issues of standing and
existence of private cause of action under the Shipping Act); Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce,
711 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1983) (when question of standing and existence of valid claim
collapse into one, only standing question is whether plaintiffs have suffered an injury).
The Eighth Circuit has properly analyzed personal claims brought by employers
against trustees as an implied cause of action issue rather than as a question of whether
an employer has standing to sue under § 502. In Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pen-
sion Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 38 (D. Minn. 1980),
afl'd sub. nom. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Jack Cole-Dixie High-
way Co., 642 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981), the district court noted that neither § 502 nor
ERISA's legislative history indicated an intent to permit employers to seek damages for a
trustee's failure to prudently manage a trust. The court decided that employers had no
implied cause of action under § 502 for damages caused by an alleged breach of fiduciary
duty. The court carefully explained the detrimental impact such a cause of action would
have on ERISA's enforcement scheme. See Central States, 511 F. Supp. at 47-48.
The Category 2 cases are those which either permit or do not permit employers to sue
on behalf of their employees under § 502. The employers in these cases were asserting
their employees' rights under ERISA. See Fentron, 674 F.2d at 1303 (employer seeking
employee redress for alleged wrongful termination of employee rights); Central Tool, 523
F. Supp. at 814 n.4 (same). The Ninth Circuit in Fentron permitted an employer to sue
under § 502 as a third party provided he had suffered an injury in fact. See 674 F.2d at
1304; see also 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra, § 3531.9, at 579 n.67.
Although the District of Columbia district court denied an employer third-party stand-
ing, these two decisions might be reconcilable because it is within a court's discretion to
permit third-party standing. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra, § 3531.9.
Courts have permitted an employer who has suffered an injury in fact to assert his
employees' rights in circumstances suggesting a congruence rather than a conflict of in-
terests with his employees. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
573-74 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1980); Gajon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Kelly, 508 F.2d 1317, 1322 n.9
(2d Cir. 1974). The congruence requirement is essential for an ERISA action when an
employer is asserting his employees' statutory rights because an employer's interest could
be at odds with the employees' rights. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transp., 105 S. Ct. 2833, 2838 (1985) (employer has incentive to under-
report the correct number of employees because such underreporting would reduce his
payments to the Plan). Therefore, before permitting an employer to have third-party
standing in an ERISA claim, the court should ascertain the congruence of interest be-
tween the employer and his employees.
The failure to distinquish between Categories I and 2 has led at least one court to
interpret the Ninth Circuit's Fentron decision as an indication that employers can sue for
a breach of fiduciary duty unrelated to participants' rights. See Building Serv. Employees
Pension Trust v. Horsemen's Quarter Horse Racing Ass'n, 98 F.R.D. 458, 459 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (trustees allegedly forced employers to overpay). This is a harmful result be-
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under another section of ERISA for a remedy unrelated to the enforce-
ment of participants' and beneficiaries' rights?
Section 403 of ERISA requires the assets of a plan to be held in a trust
by one or more trustees.42 Section 403 further states that the "assets of a
plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for
the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan
and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administer-
ing the plan."'43 However, this exclusive purpose section permits trustees
to refund mistaken contributions made by an employer." The exclusive
purpose rule "shall not prohibit the return of such [mistaken] contribu-
tion."45 This section does not give an employer an express cause of ac-
tion for the return of mistaken contributions.46
The courts disagree on whether section 403 creates for employers an
implied cause of action for restitution.47 The Third Circuit affirmed a
cause a cause of action might by inferred without the proper inquiry into Congress' intent
to create such a cause of action for employers under ERISA.
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982). For exceptions to this general requirement, see
id. § 1103(b).
43. Id. § 1103(c)(1). Section 403(c)(1) and (2)(A) further states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) or subsection (d) of this
section, or under sections 1342 and 1344 of this title (relating to termination of
insured plans), the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any em-
ployer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to par-
ticipants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.
(2)(A) In the case of a contribution, or a payment of withdrawal liability under
part 1 of subtitle E of subchapter III of this chapter-
(i) made by an employer to a plan (other than a multiemployer plan) by a
mistake of fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution
to the employer within one year after the payment of the contribution, and
(ii) made by an employer to a multiemployer plan by a mistake of fact or law
(other than a mistake relating to whether the plan is described in section 401(a)
of title 26 or the trust which is part of such plan is exempt from taxation under
section 501(a) of title 26), paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such
contribution or payment to the employer within 6 months after the plan admin-
istrator determines that the contribution was made by such a mistake.
Id. § 403(c)(1), (c)(2)(A).
44. See, e.g., Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066,
1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986); Crown Cork &
Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affid mem.,
720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1982).
46. See, e.g., Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066,
1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986); Crown Cork &
Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afj'd
mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
The Tenth Circuit has determined that § 403 gives self-employed individuals who are
plan participants a right to restitution for amounts paid into the fund for their own ac-
count. See Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 719 F.2d 1063, aff'd as modified, 724 F.2d 100
(10th Cir. 1983). The question whether employers qua employers have a similar right
was left unresolved. See id. at 100.
47. Compare Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d
1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985) (§ 403(c)(2)(A) confers on employers a right to the restitution
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district court's decision holding that no implied cause of action for resti-
tution for employers arises under section 403.11 The district court be-
lieved that employers were not the particular group ERISA was intended
to protect.49 The district court believed that the phrase "shall not pro-
hibit" expressed a congressional intent only to allow, not require, trustees
to return mistaken contributions 5°---a mere exception to trustees' strict
fiduciary duties to maintain funds solely for the benefit of participants.5
The court also believed an implied right for restitution would threaten
the fund's stability.52
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 403 implies a right
of action for employers. 3 The court thought that section 403 was en-
acted to benefit employers.'M Without an implied right of restitution, the
decision to return contributions mistakenly paid would be left to the dis-
cretion of the "interested trustee."' ' Further, this implied right of action
advances Congress' intent to permit restitution of contributions paid by
mistake when equitable factors favor restitution. 6 Finally, because
ERISA preempted all state law on employee benefit plans, the court
found no principle of federal-state comity making a federal cause of ac-
tion inappropriate.57
The Ninth Circuit's holding is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's in-
of mistakenly paid contributions), cert denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986)
and E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp.
1122, 1124-25 (D. Minn. 1981) (§ 403(c)(2)(A) gives employer right to refund if equity
requires it) with Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamster Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F.
Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Del. 1985) (§ 403(c)(2)(A) does not confer on employers an im-
plied right of restitution), Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F.
Supp. 307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), affid mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983) and
Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (V.D. Pa. 1983) (same). See
also Teamster's Local 348 Health & Welfare Fund v. Kohn Beverage Co., 749 F.2d 315,
321 n.6 (6th Cir. 1984) (dictum) (an employer has no cause of action under § 403), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2024 (1985); Martin v. Keldorn, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 889, 894 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (§ 403 permits, but does not require, offset of overpayments against underpay-
ments); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(§ 403(c)(2)(A) gives employer legal recourse for offset).
48. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311
(E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
49. See id; see also Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund,
618 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D. Del. 1985).
50. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311
(E.D. Pa. 1982), ajfd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Airco Indus. Gases v.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 950 (D. Del. 1985) (lan-
guage of § 403 does not create a cause of action for employers).
51. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311-
312 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affid mer., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
52. See id. at 312.
53. See Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066,
1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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terpretation of section 403. The Fourth Circuit has held that employers
have no right to an automatic refund under section 403. Rather, they
can obtain a refund only under principles of restitution. 8
B. Implied Federal Rights of Action-The Role
of Congressional Intent
The Supreme Court has been reluctant in recent years to imply private
rights of action under federal statutes. 9 These decisions reflect the
Court's unwillingness to extend its jurisdiction6" or to infringe on legisla-
tive powers by implying causes of action Congress never intended to cre-
58. See Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir.
1981). The Fourth Circuit did not explicitly discuss the issue of whether an implied
cause of action for restitution existed. See id.; see also Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Plan v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887-88 (D. Minn.)
(employer entitled to offset for overpaid contributions under § 403(c)(2)(A) without con-
sideration of the section's permissive phraseology), affid, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979);
Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-Management Trust Fund v. Baucom
Janitorial Serv., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1980) (same).
59. In recent terms, the Supreme Court decided twelve cases in which plaintiffs
sought an implied cause of action under a federal statute. In nine cases, the Court refused
to find an implied right of action. Compare Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (recognizing implied right of action under Title VI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964), Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-87 (1983)
(affirming existence of implied right of action under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-88
(1982) (recognizing implied right of action for damages under Commodities Exchange
Act) with Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3092-94 (1985)
(no implied right under ERISA for extra-contractual damages to a beneficiary caused by
improper processing of benefit claims), Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523,
534-41 (1984) (no implied right of action for investment companies under § 36(b) of In-
vestment Company Act of 1940), Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalga-
mated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 23-29 (1982) (no implied cause of action under Urban
Mass Transportation Act for violations of labor agreements), Middlesex County Sewer-
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11-21 (1981) (no implied private
right of action for damages against state and federal officials for failure to enforce provi-
sions of Water Pollution Control Act or Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972), Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981) (no
implied right of action for contribution from coconspirators under federal antitrust laws),
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-98 (1981) (no implied cause of action under
§ 10 of Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899), Northwest Airlines v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-95 (1981) (no implied right of action for contribution in
Title VII suits), Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-27 (1981)
(no implied right of action under section 6010 of Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act of 1975), and Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754,
771-84 (1981) (no implied right of action for back wages under Davis-Bacon Act under
contract which was not covered by the Act).
At an earlier time federal courts, relying primarily on common law tort principles,
generously conferred rights of action on private litigants. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
60. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3094 (1985)
("Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply"); Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) ("[i]t is, of course, not
within our competence as federal judges to amend these comprehensive enforcement
schemes").
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ate.6 ' Thus, the Court has strictly adhered to a congressional intent
analysis when determining the existence of an implied cause of action
under a federal statute.62
Whether Congress intended to create a cause of action is a matter of
statutory construction.63 The Court has considered the following factors
when interpreting a statute to determine legislative intent: the lan-
guage,' legislative history and purpose of the statute;61 the identity of
the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; 66 the exist-
ence of express statutory remedies adequate to accomplish the legislative
purpose;67 and the states' traditional role in providing the relief sought.6
The Court also has considered the state of the law when the statute was
61. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 18 (1981) ("[w]here ... Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not
contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment"); North-
west Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (courts' lawmaking
powers are limited); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31, 743 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (implied cause of action violates separation of powers doctrine);
Note, State Incorporation Of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal
Rights ofAction, 94 Yale L.J. 1144, 1146 (1985) [hereinafter cited as State Incorporation].
But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375-76
(1982) (no violation of separation of powers doctrine by judical recognition of implied
causes of action).
62. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court developed a four-factor test to
determine whether a private right of action should be implied under a federal statute.
(1) the identity of the class for whose special benefit the statute was passed, (2) consider-
ation of implicit or explicit legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy, (3) the
consistency of a private remedy with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme,
and (4) the traditional role of the states in providing the relief sought. See id. at 78.
In subsequent decisions, the Court essentially compressed the Cort test into one fac-
tor-legislative intent. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
Denial of an implied right of action by a federal court does not preclude the creation of
state remedies, unless federal preemption exists. See State Incorporation, supra note 61,
for a discussion that state incorporation of federal standards into a state law right of
action is an appropriate response to the Supreme Court's current hostility toward impli-
cation of federal rights of action.
63. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
64. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16-19 (1979)
(Court determined that Congress intended to create a private right of action under § 215
of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 based solely on the statute's language); see also
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) (initial focus in determining legislative intent is statutory language); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (same).
65. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); North-
west Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981).
66. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984); California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984); Transamerica
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enacted. 69 For example, if an implied federal cause of action existed
prior to a legislative revision of the particular statute, the question then
becomes whether Congress intended to preserve, rather than create, the
pre-existing remedy under the statute.70
C. Congressional Intent and Section 403
The impact of ERISA's preemption provision on state restitution law7I
together with section 403's language and purpose indicates that Congress
must have intended to permit a cause of action for restitution for employ-
ers under section 403.72 In addition, Congress' authorization of the de-
velopment of a body of federal common law in the area of pension plans
shows that Congress must have intended the courts to imply appropriate
causes of action.7a Thus, section 502's list of parties empowered to sue
for civil enforcement remedies should not foreclose implying this restitu-
tive cause of action for employers.
The legislative history of ERISA also indicates that Congress must
have intended a restitutive remedy for employers. Although ERISA was
enacted primarily to protect participants' and beneficiaries' rights to re-
ceive benefits, 74 Congress knew that overburdening employers could
thwart the growth of pension plans.75 When enacting ERISA, Congress
wanted to strike an appropriate balance between the employers' interests
in maintaining flexibility in the design and operation of their pension pro-
grams and the employees' need for protection of their rights and
expectations. 6
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979).
68. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984); California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (quoting Colt v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
69. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536-41 (1984); Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383-87 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982).
70. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-79
(1982); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983) ("Congress'
decision to leave § 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of
the § 10(b) action").
Although congressional intent is the touchstone in an implied cause of action analysis,
Daily Income Fund makes clear all these factors may be considered in discerning legisla-
tive intent.
71. See infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 10, 15, 33 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
76. See 120 Cong. Rec. 4278 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2,
at 3369 (statement of Rep. Perkins); H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1973),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2348, 2356; S. Rep. No. 383, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1063, 1069; S.
Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 587, 599; 126 Cong. Rec. 23,038 (1980) (statement of Rep. Thompson); see also
[Vol. 54
EMPLOYER RESTITUTION
1. Pre-ERISA State Remedy for Mistaken Contributions
to a Pension Plan
The law of restitution" provides a remedy for a party who has paid
money because he believed that he was obligated to do so,7 when in fact
he either had no obligation or was not bound to the full extent of the
performance rendered.79 An action for the recovery of the mistakenly
paid sum" exists in restitution because the other party has been "un-
justly enriched"81 by this mistake. Restitution of the overpayment will
be given unless returning the money is unjust.8 2 If, for example, the "un-
justly enriched" party has changed position in reliance on the mistake,
restitution may be denied. 3
Employers often mistakenly contribute significant amounts of money"
to employee benefit plans because they believe they are required to do so
when actually no such obligation exists.8" In such cases, the employee
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congress was
concerned with employers' interests when enacting ERISA), aff'd mem. sub. nom.
Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
77. The threshold maxim of the modern law of restitution is that "[a] person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other." Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937). See generally 1 G. Palmer, Law of Resti-
tution §§ 1.1-.8 (1978).
78. It is an established general rule that money mistakenly paid to another because
the payor did not have full knowledge of all the facts may be recovered. See D. Dobbs,
Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 11.1, at 716 (1973); Restatement of Restitution
§§ 6, 7, 15, 16, 18 (1937). In general, relief was not available, though, if the mistake was
one of law occurring when the payor had full knowledge of the facts but came to an
erroneous conclusion as to their legal effect. See 3 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 616-
620 (1960); 13 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §§ 1581-1592 (3d ed. 1957).
However, this rule denying relief because the mistake was one of law "has been eroded by
so many qualifications and exceptions, varying from jurisdiction, that it has little, if any,
vitality." J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-28, at 309 (2d ed. 1977)
(footnote omitted).
79. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 78, § 9-29; G. Palmer, Mistake and Un-
just Enrichment 21-32 (1962) [hereinafter cited as G. Palmer If]; Restatement of Restitu-
tion § 18 (1937).
80. Recovery usually is given in quasi-contract under the title "money paid by mis-
take" in an action for money had and received. See 2 G. Palmer, supra note 77, § 11.2, at
491; 3 G. Palmer, supra note 77, § 14.1, at 143-44.
81. See G. Palmer II, supra note 79, at 23; Restatement of Restitution, § 1 comment a
(1937).
82. See 3 G. Palmer, supra note 77, § 14.1, at 147-48.
83. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 78, § 9-30, at 310-11.
84. See, ,,g., Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865 (4th Cir.
1981) (court determined excess of $4,483.44); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 945 (D. Del. 1985) (amount of S25,831.41);
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877, 879 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (excess of $2,647.78); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549
F. Supp. 307, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employer alleged $80,000 excess contribution), aff'd
mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp.
365, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (excess of $64,268.68); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D. Minn. 1981) (amount of
$15,136.00).
85. See Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066 (9th
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benefit plans are unjustly enriched. Accordingly, prior to ERISA, a
state's law of restitution was available to provide a remedy86 for employ-
ers who had mistakenly overcontributed to employee benefit plans.8 7
2. ERISA's Preemption of State Restitution Law
Under ERISA, Congress established a comprehensive regulatory
scheme." In the interest of uniformity, 9 Congress provided for the pre-
Cir. 1985) (employer not a party to collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 54
U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986); Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646
F.2d 865, 866 (4th Cir. 1981) (employer mistakenly believed he had contractual obliga-
tion to pay); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F.
Supp. 943, 945 (D. Del. 1985) (employer mistakenly paid for two misclassified employ-
ees); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877, 878-
79 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (field audit revealed overpayments); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Team-
sters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (collective bargaining agree-
ment did not require amount employer contributed), affid mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.
1983); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 366-67 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(field audit revealed overpayment); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Ar-
eas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1123 (D. Minn. 1981) (employer continued to con-
tribute after expiration of agreement); Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-
Management Trust Fund v. Baucom Janitorial Serv., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C.
1980) (miscalculation); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale
Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Minn.) (employer mistakenly made pay-
ments on behalf of a particular employee), affidper curiam, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
86. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 366 So. 2d 251, 257
(Ala. 1978) (principle of unjust enrichment permits recovery of money paid by mistake);
Winslow Cohu & Stetson, Inc. v. Skowronek, 136 N.J. Super. 97, 104, 344 A.2d 350, 354
(1975) (considered unjust enrichment to permit recipient to retain mistakenly paid money
unless its return would be inequitable); Matter of Guardianship of Kordecki, 95 Wis. 2d
275, 282, 290 N.W.2d 693, 696 (1980) (person who confers benefit on another because of
a mistake is entitled to restitution).
87. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307,
308 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affld mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.),
affd per curiam, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); cf Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729-30
(7th Cir. 1979) (ERISA preempts any state claim for restitution of contributions).
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) did not preempt employers' restitu-
tion claims under state law for mistaken contributions to employee benefit plans estab-
lished under § 302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). See Chase v.
Trustees of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 746-47 & n. 1
(9th Cir. 1985) (state law, if not preempted by ERISA, governs reimbursement of contri-
butions made from 1969 through 1974 to § 302(c)(5) plans); Wong v. Bacon, 445 F.
Supp. 1177, 1180-82 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (parties agree state law, if not preempted by ER-
ISA, gives plaintiffs right to restitution for mistaken contributions to § 302(c)(5) plans);
see also Connell v. United States Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Con-
gress affirmatively provided that state law [and not LMRA] govern pension and welfare
trust matters."); Beam v. International Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1975)
(court applies traditional trust law to § 302 claim). But see Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals,
Inc., 298 F.2d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1962) (federal law applies to § 302 breach of fiduciary
duty suits).
88. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc. 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-62 & n.1 (1980).
89. See Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir. 1985) (preemption
provision protects employers from conflicting and inconsistent state and local regula-
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emption of state laws relating to employee benefit plans. Section 514
states that "the provisions of [Title I] and [Title IV] shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan. .. ."9 Section 514 has been described as a "vir-
tually unique pre-emption provision"91 and also as "the most sweeping
federal preemption statute ever enacted by Congress."99 2
ERISA has not, however, completely eliminated the states' regulatory
domain in the area of employee benefit plans.93 Section 514 provides that
state law is not preempted in certain situations. If a state law regulates
either a governmental,9 4 church, foreign" or excess benefit plan96 or one
that is maintained for the sole purpose of complying with workers' com-
pensation, unemployment or disability laws, it is not preempted by sec-
tion 514.9' Also excluded from section 514's preemptions" are state
tions); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 2, at
4670 (statement of Rep. Dent) (preemption provision protects participants from conflict-
ing and inconsistent state regulations); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 Leg-
islative History, supra note 2, at 4770-71 (statement of Sen. Javits) (state action in field of
private employee benefit plans must be displaced to provide uniformity). See generally
Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law under ERISA, 1979 Duke LJ. 383 (dis-
cussion of § 514); Comment, ERISA and the Preemption of State Law, 6 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 599 (1978) (same).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). This section does not apply to any cause of action
which arose, or any act or omission which occurred, before Januray 1, 1975. See id.
§ 1144(b)(1).
91. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust Fund, 463 U.S. 1, 24
n.26 (1983); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (198 1) (Con-
gress explicitly stated ERISA's broad preemptive effect).
92. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.) (Congress intended
to occupy the field of employee benefit plans), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981); Wad-
sworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977) (Congress intended preemption in its
"broadest sense"), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Lucash v. Strick Corp., 602 F. Supp.
430, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("Congress intended to completely occupy the field of employee
benefit plans"), afid, 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985); Lederman v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (Congress intended ERISA to preempt
entire field of employee benefit plans); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legis-
lative History, supra note 2, at 4670 (statement of Rep. Dent) ("I wish to make note of
what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal
authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.").
93. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25
(1983); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plan"
An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1313, 1315 (1984).
94. See supra note 7.
95. A foreign benefit plan is one maintained outside the United States primarily for
the benefit of nonresident aliens. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4) (1982).
96. The term "excess benefit plan" means a plan maintained by an employer solely for
the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the allowable limits
established for tax-qualified plans. See id. § 1002(36).
97. These plans are referred to as § 4(b) plans in § 514(a). See id. § 1144(a). Sections
4(b) plans, defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), are not governed by ERISA. See id. § 1003(b).
98. Another express exception provision states that section 514 shall not apply to the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act. See id. § 1144(b)(5).
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criminal laws9 9 and state laws regulating insurance, banking, securitiesIcJ
or multiple-employer welfare arrangements. 01
Section 514's structure requires a two-step analysis to determine
whether ERISA preempts a particular state law.12 The first step is to
determine whether the state law "relate[s] to" employee benefit plans., 0 3
Once a court determines that a state law "relate[s] to" the plan,' °4 the
next preemption inquiry is whether the law is saved by one of section
514's exceptions. 10 5
Supreme Court decisions give the phrase "relate to" a broad meaning.
A state law "relate[s] to" a benefit plan if the law has a connection with
or reference to such a plan.'06 The Court has stated that "[t]he pre-
emption provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within
its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements."'10 7
ERISA should preempt a state's law of restitution when it permits re-
covery of mistaken contributions to employee benefit plans because it
"relate[s] to" these plans under the Supreme Court's broad definition of
this phrase l and does not fall within any of the express preemption
99. See id. § 1144(b)(4).
100. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
101. See id. § 1144(b)(6). A multiple-employer welfare arrangement is an employee
welfare benefit plan which provides welfare benefits to employees of two or more employ-
ers if such plan is not established or maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment or by a rural electric cooperative. See id. § 1002(40)(A).
102. See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 93, at 1317-18.
103. See id.
104. See generally Kilberg & Inman, supra note 93, at 1320-27 (discussion of courts'
analysis of the "relate to" requirement).
105. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1985);
Kilberg & Inman, supra note 93, at 1318. An inherent tension exists between § 514's
general preemption provision and its exceptions. While the general preemption provison
broadly preempts state law, the section's saving clause appears to broadly preserve states'
lawmaking powers over much of the same regulation. See Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at
2389 & n.16 (1985). In particular, the insurance saving clause has caused a significant
overlap between ERISA and state law. See Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d
1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (state laws regulating insurance which prescribes same con-
duct as ERISA "may provide a cause of action in place of, in addition to, or coequal with
any cause of action available under ERISA"); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) (insurance clause saved a state-man-
dated benefit statute).
106. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). But "[s]ome state actions
may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to war-
rant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." Id. at 100 n.21. In addition, state laws
which affect fundamental state interests have not been found preempted by ERISA. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S, 1, 25-26 (1983)
(state tax levy); Kilberg & Inman, supra note 93, at 1320-21.
107. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1985).
"[E]ven indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of
exclusive federal concern." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525
(1981).
108. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. An action for the restitution of
mistaken contributions relates to the corpus of an ERISA trust fund and is therefore
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exceptions."' 9 All courts considering the issue have concluded that
ERISA preempts a state's law of restitution and thus this state remedy is
unavailable to employers. 110
3. The Power of Federal Courts to Create Common Law in the
Private Pension Plan Area
Although section 502 provides express causes of action for only par-
ticipants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries and the Secretary of Labor,"' the
omission of employers from section 502 should not foreclose the infer-
ence of a cause of action for restitution for employers under section
403.112 Congress authorized the federal courts to develop substantive
law to resolve issues involving rights and obligations under private em-
preempted. See Justice v. Bankers Trust Co., 607 F. Supp. 527, 532 (N.D. Ala. 1985); see
also Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985) (ERISA preemp-
tion extends to state common law causes of action); Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 429 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (state's common law will be preempted if
in its application the common law "relate[s] to" employee benefit plans); Central States,
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 38, 48 (D. Minn. 1980) (state common law preempted), aff'd sub. nom. Central
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Jack Cole-Dixie Highway Co., 642 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1981).
109. A state's restitution law is neither a criminal, insurance, banking or security law.
See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Nor does the preemption of state restitu-
tion law infringe on what courts have considered to be a state's fundamental interest. See
supra note 106.
A state's law of restitution is not preempted when it applies to a governmental, church,
foreign, excess benefit or multiple-employer welfare plans or one that is maintained for
the sole purpose of complying with workers' compensation, unemployment or disability
laws. See supra notes 94-97, 101 and accompanying text.
110. See Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419 (2d Cir. 1985);
Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744,
746 (9th Cir. 1985); Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 719 F.2d 1063, 1065, aff'd as modi-
fied, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir.
1979); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1984); District 65,
UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); UAW
v. Dyneer Corp., 4 Employee Benefit Cases 1486, 1488 (N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd per
curiam, 747 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1984); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v.
Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 611
F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
111. See supra notes 35-38, 40 and accompanying text.
112. Section 502 is concerned only with causes of action which lead to the civil en-
forcement of participants' and beneficiaries' rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982) (heading
of section 502 is "Civil enforcement"); cf Stone & Webster Eng'g. Corp. v. Ilsley, 690
F.2d 323, 326-28 (2d Cir. 1982) (employer brought declaratory judgment action regard-
ing ERISA's preemption of a state statute and court had subject matter jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)), aff'd mer. sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g
Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
A broad reading of the cases which have denied employer standing under section 502,
see supra note 41, may lead to the conclusion that an employer can never have an implied
cause of action under any section of ERISA. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12,
Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union v. Award Serv., Inc., 763 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985).
This Note argues that these cases should be read as only denying employers implied
causes of action under civil enforcement § 502. See supra note 41.
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ployee benefit plans. 13 Accordingly, courts should have greater freedom
implying causes of action under ERISA than under other federal statutes
because of the courts' power to create common law in the private pension
plan area.1 14
Moreover, implying an employer's cause of action for restitution under
section 403 would not alter the carefully crafted enforcement scheme cre-
ated by section 502115 because a new liability is not being created" 1 6 to
enforce participants' and beneficiaries' rights created by ERISA. I7
Rather, the implied cause of action under section 403 preserves the em-
ployers' claim for restitution of mistaken contributions."'
4. Preserving Restitution by Implying It under ERISA
The Supreme Court stated in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. CurranI19 that in determining whether a private cause of action is
implicit in a federal statutory scheme, the initial focus must be on the
state of the law when the legislation was enacted and whether Congress
intended to preserve pre-existing remedies. 2 Prior to ERISA's enact-
113. See Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985) (Congress in-
tended courts to fashion a body of federal common law to govern ERISA suits); Van
Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Murphy v. Hep-
penstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Senator Javits' remarks as support
for congressional authorization of the evolution of federal common law of pension plans),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Philadelphia Fruit
Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (employees' claims based on federal com-
mon law of pension funds); Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Wel-
fare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 818-19 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (courts are to create federal
common law); H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legis-
lative History, supra note 2, at 4277, 4594 (all civil actions by participants and benefi-
ciaries "are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of Labor-Management Relations Act of
1974"); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 2, at
4771 (statement of Sen. Javits) (body of federal substantive law will be developed).
114. There is neither a separation of powers problem nor an impermissible extension of
federal courts' jurisdiction because of this grant by Congress to create federal common
law in the pension area. These concerns have made the Court reluctant to infer causes of
action under federal statutes. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
115. See Massachusetts Mat. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3093 (1985).
116. In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985), the Court
held that ERISA did not provide a beneficiary with a cause of action for extra-contrac-
tual damages against fiduciaries. The Court found that Congress did not intend to au-
thorize remedies to enforce beneficiaries' rights in addition to those provided by § 502.
See id. at 3093; see also Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93-
94 (1981) (express remedies indicate an intent not to authorize additional remedies).
117. See supra notes 13-20, 32 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
119. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
120. See id. at 378-79. In Merrill Lynch, the Court focused on whether Congress in-
tended to preserve a pre-existing federal implied cause of action for damages under the
Commodities Exchange Act after a legislative revision of the statute. Section
403(c)(2)(A) was revised in 1980 by the MPPAA. See Crown Cork & Seal v. Teamsters
Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 308-09 (E.D. Pa.), affid mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.
1983). Prior to the revision the section read: "'In the case of a contribution which is
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ment, a state restitution remedy was available for such mistakes in per-
formance. 2 ' To preserve a restitutive remedy after ERISA was passed, a
federal remedy would have to exist because of the Act's preemption of
state restitution law.
1 22
The impact of ERISA's unique preemption provision 123 reveals that
Congress must have intended section 403 to preserve an employer's cause
of action for restitution. 24 If an employer is denied a restitutive remedy
under section 403, he cannot resort to state law to obtain the relief he
seeks.125 The harsh result which would occur if an employer is denied an
implied cause of action 2 6 flouts Congress' intent to provide an appropri-
ate balance between employers and participants. 121 Unless an employer
who has mistakenly contributed too much to a plan has a federal cause of
action for restitution, 2 s he is without a legal recourse.' 29 The employer
made by an employer by a mistake of fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of
such contribution to the employer within one year after the payment of the contribu-
tion.'" See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1103 (1982) (History). Before the 1980 revision, two courts
permitted offsets for employers for overpaid contributions without consideration of the
permissive phraseology of § 403(c)(2)(A). See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884 (D. Minn.), aftfd, 611 F.2d 694
(8th Cir. 1979); Service Employee Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-Management Trust Fund
v. Baucom Jantorial Serv., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. 1980). Therefore, whether a
federal implied cause of action for restitution existed under Section 403 prior to the 1980
revision is unclear because of the lack of recognition. Cf Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-86 (1983) (private right of action under Securities Act of 1934
had been consistently recognized for more than 35 years prior to revision); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379 (1982) (federal courts
routinely and consistently recognized implied private cause of action under Commodity
Exchange Act prior to its revision).
121. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
124. Cf Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979)
(Congress must have assumed that § 215, which declares certain contracts void, would
provide a cause of action for rescission, injunctions and restitution).
125. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
126. Significant amounts of money are often mistakenly contributed by employers. See
supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 11, 76 and accompanying text.
128. An employer may also have a cause of action for restitution only under federal
common law. See Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618
F. Supp. 943, 950-51 (D. Del. 1985). The district court held that although employers had
no implied cause of action under § 403, they did have a federal common law action for
unjust enrichment. The court, after considering only the Cori v. Ash factors, found that
there was insufficient evidence that Congress intended to provide a remedy under § 403.
See id. at 949-50. The court stated, however, that this result did not mean that Congress
intended to forbid such a cause of action and concluded that employers have a federal
common law action which was inferred from Congress' authorization to federal courts to
create common law in this area. See id. at 950. The court noted that its result was
"essentially consistent" with those cases implying a cause of action under § 403. See id.
at 950; see also Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction
or the Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355 (1980) (suggesting that an
implied cause of action analysis is consistent with a federal common law analysis).
129. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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would be at the mercy of the trustee to return the funds. 130 These re-
funds may not be readily granted by the trustee because if he errs he may
be personally liable to the fund. 131
The language of section 403,132 by explicitly stating an exception to the
exclusive purpose rule for mistaken payments, shows that Congress must
have intended this section to benefit employers by preserving their right
to restitution when they mistakenly overcontributed.133 In addition, the
purpose of section 403 suggests that Congress must have intended to pre-
serve a restitutive remedy for employers. Section 403's prohibition
against the plan's assets inuring to the employer's benefit was intended to
prevent misconduct, insider abuse and corruption. 134 This section was
130. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307,
311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (trustees can return contributions if they choose to do so), aJfd
mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp.
365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (if trustees' determinations were always accepted, there would
be no restitution under § 403(c)(2)(A)); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124-25 (D. Minn. 1981) (trustees have no incen-
tive to voluntarily return funds). But see Electricians Health, Welfare and Pension Plans,
Local No. 995 v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1272, n.15 (M.D. La. 1984) (judicial review
of administrator's decisions that no contribution was mistakenly made is available to
employer). This right to review has been used by courts only when the trustees owe a
duty to the complaining party. See, e.g., Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1981) (review of action to enforce benefit rights); Horn v. Mullins, 650 F.2d 35
(4th Cir. 1981) (review of denial of employee's disability); Bayles v. Central States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1979) (review of denial of early retire-
ment benefits). Thus, it is not clear whether employers would have this right to review if
they did not have a right to restitution under § 403.
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982). Trustees could be sued for breach of their duty
to hold the assets of the plan for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to partici-
pants and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan if they mistakenly
refunded an amount to an employer. See id. § 1103(c)(1).
132. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
133. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979)
(based on language of § 215, Congress must have intended that suits for rescission, in-
junction and restitution be available). The phrases used in § 403 are "mistake of fact" or
"mistake of fact or law." See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1982). Such phrases are used in
restitution actions. See supra note 78. Their presence indicates that § 403 is concerned
with providing a restitutive remedy. Cf Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2833, 2840 & n. 10 (1985) (use of word "trust"
in ERISA invokes common law of trusts).
134. See Deiches v. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F. Supp. 766, 773
(D.N.J. 1983). Prior to ERISA, trustess were not subject to the rigorous requirements of
the exclusive benefit and purpose rules. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2348, 2359. Trustees often
entered into transactions that would not benefit the covered employees. See S. Rep. No.
383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 2, at
1063, 1085; 120 Cong. Rec. 4278 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2,
at 3370 (statement of Rep. Perkins). Therefore, one of ERISA's requirements is that the
assets of the plan be held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Employers are prohibited from even tempo-
rary use of assets. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Trans-
port, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2833, 2841 & n.16 (1985). The list of prohibited transactions in 29
U.S.C. § 1106 (1982) exemplifies the abusive activities Congress enacted § 403 to prevent.
[Vol. 54
EMPLOYER RESTITUTION
not enacted to prevent the legitimate return of money mistakenly
contributed.
Thus, section 403 read in conjunction with the Act's preemption sec-
tion indicates that Congress must have intended employers to have a
cause of action for restitution under section 403. In addition, if employ-
ers are denied an implied cause of action for restitution, they might pro-
vide lower benefits when they realize this risk exists.' 3 5 The participants,
whom ERISA seeks to protect, could ultimately suffer because their level
of benefits would be lower. Under ERISA, a federal cause of action for
restitution is not only appropriate, it is necessary.
D. Guidelines for Awarding Restitution under Section 403
Section 403 sets specific guidelines for awarding restitution: an em-
ployer's mistaken contribution to a non-multiemployer plan 36 must be
one of fact and the mistaken contribution must be returned within one
year after payment. 137 An employer's mistaken contribution to a multi-
employer plan can be either one of law or fact 13 and the mistaken sum
must be returned within six months after the determination of the erro-
neous contribution. 39
Courts may look to state law for guidance when fashioning a uniform
federal law of restitution for these mistaken performance cases.""' For
example, under state restitution law if a payee raises a change of position
defense, the payor may be estopped from claiming restitution.' 4 ' Ac-
cordingly, if a plan can show that it detrimentally relied upon the excess
funds, 42 an employer will be estopped from receiving a refund. 43 This
See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 2348, 2368.
135. ERISA does not specify the level of benefits that an employee benefit plan must
provide. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Man-
hattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 371 (1980).
136. The term "multiemployer plan" means a plan to which more than one employer
is required to contribute and is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining
agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (1982).
137. See id. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(i).
138. The 1980 amendment permits mistaken contributions to a multiemployer plan to
be returned to employers if made due to a mistake of either law or fact. See supra notes
43 & 120. The reason for this change was that a mistake of fact was too narrow an
exception for multiemployer plans. See 126 Cong. Rec. 20,208 (1980) (Joint Explanation
of S.1076: Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980).
139. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
140. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (state law, if com-
patible with the purposes of § 301 of LMRA, may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy); see also Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d
1499, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1985) (Congress intended courts to borrow from state law when
fashioning a body of federal common law for ERISA).
141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142. See, eg., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307,
312 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (mistaken contributions once invested may be essential to plan's
stability), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Martin v. Keldorn, Inc., 546 F. Supp.
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allocation of burdens insures the financial stability of the plan without
placing an onerous burden of proof on employers. 1  The Ninth Circuit,
however, has indicated that the employer has the burden of showing that
a refund would not undermine the financial stability of the plan. 45 In
addition, consideration of state law principles of restitution may aid the
courts in determining what constitutes a section 403(c)(2)(A)(i) "mistake
of fact" under federal law. 146
CONCLUSION
Congress intended employers contributing to employee benefit plans
governed by ERISA to have a restitutive remedy for mistaken contribu-
tions. By providing employers with an implied cause of action, courts
are incorporating into ERISA a remedy preventing unjust enrichment
which is unrelated to the rights given to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries under the Act. A restitutive remedy will not deplete the plan of
its needed assets. Instead it will provide for the return of funds the plan
was never entitled to receive. Without this cause of action, employers
may be reluctant to provide favorable benefits in their plans or even to
establish plans at all. These results might hinder the continued growth of
private employee benefit plans. Thus, the remedy both provides justice
to the employer and furthers the aims of ERISA.
Kathleen M. Scanlon
889, 893 (N.D. I1l. 1982) (welfare fund would be required to pay twice, once to workers
and again to the employer, if mistaken contributions are returned).
143. Courts might also have to deny restitution of mistaken contributions if the refund
would violate collective bargaining duties imposed on employers by the National Labor
Relations Act since ERISA states that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to
alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States
... " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982). See Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Con-
ference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1981) (refund of
contributions made during negotiations to reach new collective bargaining agreement
could undermine negotiations).
144. For example, if employers were required to prove that the plan's financial stability
would not be undermined if the mistaken contributions were returned, employers would
have a great burden because they are unable to readily obtain the necessary financial
information. Cf. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2833, 2836 (1985) (trustees, who have duty to maintain financial records,
have difficulty keeping track of the thousands of employers in multiemployer plans);
Tuvia Convalescent Center, Inc. v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees,
717 F.2d 726, 727 (2d Cir. 1983) (fund refused to give employer requested financial data).
145. See Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069
(9th Cir. 1985) (employer must establish that the equities favor restitution), cert. denied,
54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986).
146. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 867 (4th
Cir. 1981); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, v. Wholesale Produce Sup-
ply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.), affdper curiam, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
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